Income Volatility and Preferences for Redistribution (with Sheryl Ball and Alec Smith) [Latest Version]
Abstract: This paper investigates how individuals’ preferences for income redistribution respond to differences in expected income and income volatility. Using a stylized theoretical framework and a controlled online experiment, we examine both self-interested and other-regarding motives in redistributive decision-making under risk. The results reveal clear and systematic patterns: individuals assigned lower expected incomes than their partners choose higher redistribution rates, while ex-ante richer individuals select significantly lower rates consistent with existing evidence on inequality. Participants facing higher income volatility also favor greater redistribution, suggesting a strong self-insurance motive, whereas those with more stable incomes exhibit lower support for redistribution. However, interactions with altruism are generally weak, indicating that social preferences play a limited role when decisions involve income risk. Together, these findings highlight how other-regarding and insurance motives jointly shape redistributive behavior in risky environments.
How Many and Which Women Own Land in India? Inter-Gender and Intra-Gender Gaps (with Bina Agarwal and Malvika Mahesh), The Journal of Development Studies, 2021. DOI: 10.1080/00220388.2021.1887478
Political Betrayal Aversion: An Exploration of Betrayal Aversion and Voting (with Braxton Gately, Jason Aimone and Sheryl Ball) Preparing for Submission
Summary: This paper studies how aversion to institutional betrayal influences voter behavior. Using a pre-registered experiment, we show that voters exhibit strong betrayal aversion, avoiding candidates perceived as likely to violate trust even when doing so is materially costly.
Does Economic Risk Amplify Identity-Based Bias in Redistribution? (with Sheryl Ball and Alec Smith)
Summary: We experimentally examine whether exposure to economic risk strengthens in-group favoritism and out-group bias in redistributive choices. We hypothesize that higher income risk amplifies out-group bias and reshape support for redistribution across social groups.
Propaganda Impacts on Cooperation in Public Goods Games (with Sergio Barrera and Nathaniel Burke)
Summary: Using a modified public goods experiment with propaganda-based priming and identity revelation, we study how political messaging shapes intergroup trust, and cooperation in diverse groups.
Information Design with Manipulation (with Salil Sharma and Ankush Garg)
Summary: We develop a model of information design with a strategic manipulator and naïve receivers, showing how the designer’s degree of benevolence versus compromise determines whether information is fully or only partially revealing.